

COMPROMISING WITH EVIL

AN ARCHIVAL HISTORY OF GREATER SUDAN, 2007 – 2012

Annex VI: Chad 2006—2012

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The Looming Chaos in Chad

First appeared in the *Boston Globe*, April 26, 2006

Idriss Déby, the president of the central African country of Chad, may soon lose power to a group of variously motivated rebel movements. The deposing of Déby might not seem occasion for much regret: he is a cruel, tyrannical, and corrupt man who has squandered a great deal of Chad's new-found oil wealth. But the rebels who would replace him have the deeply troubling support of the genocidal regime in Khartoum, Sudan. In recent months, as Human Rights Watch has authoritatively reported, the National Islamic Front in Khartoum has supported the Chadian rebels, even as it has loosed its own murderous Arab militia allies on the non-Arab tribal populations of eastern Chad. Indeed, Human Rights Watch reports that "the Janjaweed militias have carried out attacks inside Chad accompanied by Sudanese army troops with helicopter gunship support."

Chad's capital, N'Djamena, is far to the west of the Chad/Sudan border; but as Déby has begun to feel more threatened, he has redeployed his military forces westward and into major garrisons in a desperate bid to retain power. In fact, N'Djamena itself was attacked by the rebels on April 13, and though the assault was repelled, military assets will be increasingly concentrated in the capital and larger towns. This is bad news not only for the Chadian civilians in the east, who now have almost no protection, but for the quarter-million Darfuri refugees who are increasingly threatened in camps up and down the very long Chad/Sudan border. Aid organizations have already begun to withdraw from some refugee camps, and after the April 13 attack, the UN's World Food Program (the lead UN logistical organization in Chad) ordered the evacuation of all non-essential personnel from N'Djamena. Humanitarian access and security in eastern Chad continue to deteriorate badly as Khartoum turns the region into an extension of the Darfur killing fields.

And things will soon get worse. Heavy seasonal rains begin in late May or June, and these will sever the key east-west road arteries in Chad (as they do in Darfur). It will become impossible for humanitarian supplies to move overland. Moreover, a new government — beholden to Khartoum — may decide to obstruct humanitarian aid in the same way that Khartoum has in Darfur. Even air drops of food and medical supplies could be hindered.

This may in the end have more to do with the chaos that will ensue if Khartoum succeeds in its effort to topple Déby. There is little evidence of common cause among the various rebel groups fighting under the vague umbrella of the "United Front for Change." The end of Déby's rule is likely to usher in a period of infighting

and chaos. Neighboring Cameroon and the Central African Republic may also be destabilized.

None of this much matters to the *génocidaires* in Khartoum, who perceive Déby simply as a supporter of the Darfuri insurgency movements, which have two particularly prominent Zaghawa leaders. Déby is also a member of the non-Arab (or “African”) Zaghawa tribe, which is found on both sides of the border, and he has traditionally drawn a good deal of political and military support from his fellow tribesmen. But while Déby has certainly supported the Darfuri insurgents, most Zaghawa fault Déby for not doing nearly enough to serve their cause in Darfur.

At this point in the crisis, however, it is fruitless for the international community to apportion blame. Humanitarian needs must be addressed, and anticipated, in the most urgent fashion. Plans must be made for the continuation of humanitarian assistance to the many hundreds of thousands of desperate civilians in eastern Chad who are faced with the total loss of protection and humanitarian access. Under international pressure, Déby has backed down from his threat to expel from Chad the large Darfuri refugee population; he must be told forcefully any further such threats will diminish his support within the international community. The UN, which has dithered unconscionably in providing security for humanitarians in Darfur, must begin emergency planning for a UN peacekeeping deployment to eastern Chad. Part of its mandate must be to staunch the flow of genocidal destruction from Darfur into Chad.

All this will be only a short-term solution; the crises in Chad and Darfur are inextricably linked. If the world wishes to end genocide in Darfur, and prevent massive human destruction in eastern Chad, it must exert immediate, concerted, and substantial pressure on Khartoum.

Is Chad the New Darfur?

First appeared in *The New Republic*, July 12, 2006

In recent months, human rights groups and journalists have begun to report an ominous development in central Africa: the Darfur genocide, now in its fourth year, appears increasingly to be spilling over into eastern Chad. Why is this happening? As in Darfur itself, the answer is complicated and simple at the same time: complicated because an interlocking array of ethnic interests and regional considerations are at [issue]; and simple because, despite these complexities, those bearing the greatest responsibility for the violence are, yet again, the leaders of the National Islamic Front in Khartoum.

The killing in Chad bears more than a passing resemblance to the violence we have witnessed in Darfur. Here again, the human targets are overwhelmingly from non-Arab tribal groups that straddle the Chad-Darfur border. And, once again, it is primarily a combination of regular military forces from Khartoum and marauding *Janjaweed* that are to blame. Human Rights Watch has reported attacks on civilians in Chad by Khartoum's forces, including helicopter gunships. One survivor of the savage massacre of more than 100 men in the Chadian village of Djawara said that the *Janjaweed* "were wearing khaki military Sudanese clothing." The United Nations has reported, on the basis of eyewitness observation, that identity papers and badges from two *Janjaweed* militiamen killed in a recent attack were those of the Sudanese national army. *Janjaweed* from Sudan are recruiting, or coercing the assistance of, tribal counterparts in Chad. And Darfuri rebel groups are forcibly recruiting boys and men from refugee camps in Chad. This threatens to militarize the camps, making them more likely targets for violence by the *Janjaweed*.

The chaos has left more than 350,000 civilians in eastern Chad vulnerable. Their ranks include Darfuri refugees who crossed the border during the past three years as well as internally displaced Chadians. As in Darfur, it is not the violence itself that is the main threat. Rather, the violence is making it increasingly likely that humanitarian groups will have to withdraw from the region—which in turn raises the likelihood that enormous numbers of civilians, stranded without food or medical assistance at the height of the rainy season, will die. Meanwhile, the *Janjaweed*—engaged in what one senior official of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in eastern Chad has described as a "Sudanese land grab"—are using the areas of Chad where they establish control to regroup and stage new attacks in Darfur. In other words, Darfur's violence has spilled into Chad; and now that violence is spilling back into Darfur.

How did we get to this point? Khartoum is trying to punish the Chadian government of Idris Déby for its support of Darfur's rebels—and convince Chadian military and political officials to end such aid. And so Khartoum has taken two main steps. First, it is backing the United Front for Change (FCU), a loose coalition of forces that are seeking to overthrow Déby's government. Second, it has unleashed its *Janjaweed* proxies, as well as its regular military forces, against civilians in Chad—just as it did against civilians in Darfur three years ago. (Those targeted this time are primarily the non-Arab groups that live along the border, especially the Massalit and Dajo.) This combination—supporting Chadian rebels in their fight against Déby and unleashing the *Janjaweed* against Chadian civilians—has proven quite effective for Khartoum. As the threat from the rebels has grown—they attacked the capital N'Djamena in April—Déby has been forced to redeploy his own forces to garrisons and larger towns, leaving vast rural areas completely without security. (Here we should remember that Déby himself is a ruthless and rapacious ruler who has squandered virtually all of Chad's oil wealth. In other words, he is no friend of human rights.) As a result, neither civilians nor humanitarians in much of eastern Chad have any protection against *Janjaweed* predations. Indeed, the UNHCR recently noted that “[J]anjaweed attacks against Chadians appear to have become more systematic and deadly over the past three months and there is no sign that this pattern will stop.” Amnesty International, in a recent report, describes the evolving nature of *Janjaweed* attacks:

[A]s their incursions became more frequent, the Janjawid began directly to attack villages, sometimes repeatedly on successive days or over periods of months, until most of the inhabitants had been killed or forced to flee and the villages had been totally looted. ... All the villagers' possessions are taken. Sometimes repeat raids over several days ensure that there is nothing and no one left.

As in Darfur, the international community is paralyzed. The African Union, which provides a minimal security presence in Darfur, has no presence in eastern Chad—nor any mandate to operate across the border. The recent Darfur Peace Agreement has done nothing to stop this violence. It merely invoked a worthless deal signed months ago by representatives of N'Djamena and Khartoum—the so-called Tripoli Agreement, which purported to end the border conflict between Sudan and Chad, but in fact did nothing of the sort.

The people of eastern Chad, meanwhile, are defenseless against the well-armed *Janjaweed*. The men of Djawara fought desperately with bows and arrows against automatic weapons. Many of these people have been displaced two, three, even

four times; and this is in an extremely difficult environment, with little well water or arable land. The result has been severe tension between local and displaced populations competing for scarce resources.

Hundreds of thousands of human beings in the one of the most difficult environments on earth, threatened with the loss of all humanitarian assistance, pleading for security from ethnically targeted violence: It sounds a lot like Darfur circa 2003. But now the site is eastern Chad. And it is three years later. And our response is precisely the same. Never again indeed.

Darfur, Eastern Chad Face Unconstrained Human Destruction

November 26, 2006

Darfur and eastern Chad are now in the throes of uncontrolled, cataclysmic violence. Anarchic conditions are expanding with terrifying speed, even as the international community gives no evidence that it is prepared to act in any meaningful fashion to stabilize the crisis or to halt rapidly accelerating, ethnically-targeted human destruction. Humanitarian relief efforts are daily more deeply imperiled by intolerable levels of insecurity; and as UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland has very recently reported to the Security Council, Khartoum's grim war of attrition against humanitarian operations in Darfur is relentlessly more successful. Moreover, the possible collapse of the Chadian government of Idriss Déby before growing military pressure from Chadian rebel groups, supported by Khartoum, could have potentially catastrophic implications for humanitarian operations in eastern Chad.

In assessing the region's realities, UN aid chief Jan Egeland's November 22, 2006 UN Security Council report on Darfur makes clear how far genocidal destruction is from ending, and how little the international community is doing to halt the violence or provide security for the humanitarian organizations that face harassment and insecurity engineered by Khartoum.

Egeland begins his report by describing conditions he witnessed during his fourth and final mission as Emergency Relief Coordinator to Darfur, noting the Government's failure to protect its own defenseless citizens. He goes on to recount a shameful chronology of Khartoum-sponsored civilian destruction:

When I went to Darfur on my first visit in late June 2004, accompanying the Secretary-General, we saw a civilian population under attack, prompting the displacement of one million people. When I returned to Darfur last week, *four million people*, two-thirds of Darfur's population, were in need of emergency assistance. The number of internally displaced has risen to an unprecedented two million. The attacks on villages and the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians continue, reaching the horrific levels of early 2004.

To this figure of 4 million must be added some 400,000 conflict-affected civilians in eastern Chad: Darfuri refugees (220,000), Chadian internally displaced persons (90,000 according to the latest figures from the UN High Commission for

Refugees), and approaching 100,000 Chadian civilians affected in other ways by the conflict that continues its massive spill-over into eastern Chad.

There is also the ghastly death toll to date: some 500,000 people have already died from violence, disease, malnutrition, and despair since the outbreak of major conflict in February 2003.¹

The Rapidly Accelerating Crisis in Chad

Khartoum has peremptorily rejected a proposal to deploy a desperately needed international security force in eastern Chad, even as such a force is widely supported: by the UN High Commission for Refugees, by the International Rescue Committee, by Human Rights Watch, by the International Crisis Group, by both Chad and the Central Africa Republic, as well as by African Union and Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso.

Although France also seemed to commit to the idea, news reports subsequent to Nguesso's proposal suggests that France has no real stomach for a confrontation with Khartoum, despite the inescapable need for French leadership in any Chadian peacekeeping effort given France's important military presence in eastern Chad and close relationship with the Chadian government:

French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy originally proposed the UN force, but was met with resistance from Khartoum.²

At the same time, Agence France-Presse was reporting from Addis Ababa:

Khartoum, which accuses Chad of supporting rebel groups inside Sudan, said on Wednesday [November 15, 2006] evening that it was in favour of deploying "an observer force [to the Chad/Darfur border]." Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha dismissed France's suggestion of deploying a United Nations force to the border, saying it would "interfere with the work of the African force" in Darfur.³

Following Taha's contemptuous dismissal, there has been no further French discussion of a force to the Chad/Darfur border, and there seems little French willingness to push vigorously for this critical security measure, despite Douste-Blazy's proposal. Moreover, the very idea may have been overtaken by events on the ground. Khartoum-supported rebel groups captured the key eastern Chadian town of Abeche on November 25, 2006. This prompted the French to close down its air base outside Abeche, including to humanitarian flights. There is extreme concern

within the humanitarian community about the ability to provide relief for hundreds of thousands of people in this remote and bereft region. The situation on the ground is far from clear, but wire dispatches from November 26, 2006 suggest that Chadian government troops have re-captured Abeche. On the other hand, Reuters reports that, a “Chadian rebel column” was seen moving towards the capital N’Djamena “just hours after the army retook the eastern town of Abeche.”⁴

Voice of America (Geneva) reports on the most immediate concern:

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres is warning that humanitarian aid for hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees from Darfur and displaced Chadians could be jeopardized by a fresh outbreak of fighting in remote eastern Chad. [] The UN refugee agency has its local headquarters in Abeche. Its staff of 300 cares for more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur, sheltered in 12 camps. It also assists many of the 90,000 Chadians who were displaced by unrest over the past year. [] Spokesman Redmond says the fighting is putting humanitarian operations at risk...[adding that] Guterres has been warning for months that the violence and conflict in Darfur could spill over into Chad and the Central African Republic. [Redmond] says Guterres supports a call for a multi-dimensional force to patrol the Chad-Sudan border.⁵

While there are no immediate plans to evacuate humanitarian personnel, much will depend upon entirely unpredictable military developments. If Déby’s government were to fall, the French military presence in eastern Chad would be challenged and the Chadian government’s invitation to send a UN peace support operation to eastern Chad might be withdrawn. There are reports that families of UN personnel are being evacuated to Cameroon from N’Djamena, the capital of Chad and clearly the primary target of the rebel groups. There is a further report that Sudanese *Janjaweed* militia forces are moving toward Abeche from Darfur, an extremely threatening development. The Chadian rebels apparently moved through the volatile Goz Beida area in southeast Chad (previous site of extremely violent targeting of non-Arab tribal groups); there are additional reports of fighting to the north, near Guereda.

The character of the violence in eastern Chad was captured in a recent (November 15, 2006) report from Human Rights Watch (“Chad/Sudan: End Militia Attacks on Civilians: UN-AU Summit Must Strengthen International Force in Darfur and Chad”):

Since late October [2006], Human Rights Watch has documented several incidents of indiscriminate aerial bombing of civilians in north-western Darfur and Chad by Sudanese government forces.

Such cross-border military attacks by Khartoum's Antonov aircraft are consistent with the cross-border attacks on civilians involving the regime's bombers and helicopter gunships, documented by Human Rights Watch in February 2006 (and based on a "Human Rights Watch research mission to eastern Chad in January-February 2006):

On some occasions, the Janjaweed attacks [in Chad] appear to be coordinated with those of the Chadian rebels. On other occasions, Janjaweed militias have carried out attacks inside Chad accompanied by Sudanese army troops with helicopter gunship support.⁶

Concerning the use of helicopter gunships and Antonov aircraft, Human Rights Watch found that the Sudanese government had apparently been involved in attacks against Chadian civilian populations since early December 2005.⁷

These are extremely provocative military actions, and hold the clear potential to exacerbate tensions in already explosive situation, and to heighten the potential for ethnic violence in Chad. In its November 15, 2006 report, Human Rights Watch indicates that it also

collected dozens of accounts from survivors of a wave of militia attacks in Chad over the past few weeks. Victims of the militia attacks in southeastern Chad consistently state that groups of Chadian Arab nomads have been newly armed and are responsible for many of the attacks, which have killed and injured hundreds of civilians.

These new arms certainly come from Khartoum's military command and constitute further evidence of the regime's determination to de-stabilize the eastern Chad region, both to counter Darfuri rebel presence, and to extend genocidal counter-insurgency warfare, including by way of "paying" Darfuri *Janjaweed* in the form of booty from raids against civilians in Chad.

A sense of the scale of recent destruction is also offered in the recent Human Rights Watch report:

Chadian militia groups have attacked dozens of villages in southeastern Chad over the last 10 days, killing several hundred civilians, injuring scores of people and driving at least 10,000 people from their homes.

A clear pattern has emerged in which Chadian Arab militia groups are targeting non-Arab villages in southeastern Chad. [] In some instances, villages are attacked or destroyed but not looted, suggesting the motive is not robbery, and the level of brutality is rising. Human Rights Watch documented several attacks where militia members mutilated men in their custody and deliberately burned women to death.

Additionally, as an October 31, 2006 report by Lydia Polgreen of the *New York Times* reveals, the ethnic violence that has defined conflict in Darfur has the potential to move even further west in Chad. Polgreen reported from Djedidah, Chad:

Arab men on horseback rode into her village, shouting racial epithets over the rat-tat-tat of Kalashnikov gunfire. “They shouted ‘zurga,’” [Halima Sherif] said, an Arabic word for black [and also a derogatory racial epithet]. “They told us they would take our land. They shot many people and burned our houses. We all ran away.” Scenes like this one have been unfolding in the war-ravaged Darfur region of western Sudan for more than three years, and since the beginning of this year Sudanese Arabs have also been attacking Chadian villages just across Sudan’s porous border.

But the attacks on Djedidah and nine villages around it in early October [2006] took place not in Darfur, or even on Chad’s violent border with Sudan. It took place relatively deep inside Chad, about 95 kilometers, or 60 miles, from the border. Beyond that, the attack was carried out not by Sudanese raiders from across the border but by Chadian Arabs, according to victims of the attack.

None of this matters to the regime in Khartoum, which sees a destabilized eastern Chad as militarily advantageous, primarily because it works to deny Darfuri rebels a secure sanctuary and because it also brings additional pressure on the Déby government to stop supplying weapons to the Darfuri rebels.

[See the [full version](#) of this report for Polgreen’s detailed commentary on the ethnically-motivated character of these attacks, which suggests that “the racial and ethnic conflict that has infected Darfur is being copied by Chad’s Arabs.” Also included in the full report are sections on accelerating violence in Darfur and signs that Khartoum is prepared to resume war with southern Sudan.]

Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur and Eastern Chad is Rapidly Collapsing

December 5, 2006

Evacuations of humanitarian personnel have in recent days accelerated dramatically in both North Darfur and eastern Chad. Today over 100 international aid workers, primarily non-essential staff, were evacuated from el-Fasher, capital of North Darfur. This comes in the wake of armed incursions into the town by Khartoum-supported *Janjaweed* militia forces, which have for three days engaged in looting and assaults on the town's markets and civilians.

In Chad, attacks on aid organizations has also helped accelerate the collapse of humanitarian access. The UN's World Food Program reports on the effects of attacks by Khartoum-backed Chadian rebels:

Security in the region has deteriorated following rebel attacks on the towns of Abeche and Guereda in the past 10 days and remains very unpredictable for humanitarian workers. The latest staff relocations from WFP field offices in Bahai, Iriba, Guereda, Farchana and Goz Beida mean that operations will now have to be managed remotely from Abeche, with only skeleton teams remaining in proximity to the camps.⁸

As context, WFP reports:

WFP has warned that humanitarian operations in eastern Chad are becoming increasingly difficult, with periodic fighting forcing the agency to temporarily suspend all non-emergency activities in parts of the troubled region. WFP lost 483 metric tons of food when one of its warehouses in Abeche was looted following a rebel attack a little over a week ago. Two trucks carrying about 70 tons of maize, oil and sugar were attacked and looted in Biltine on November 23 [2006].

Reuters reports on the same ominous developments:

UN agencies and aid nongovernmental organizations said on Monday [December 4, 2006] they were pulling back more than 200 staff from Guereda and two other towns, Iriba and Bahai [in the more northerly

sector of eastern Chad], leaving only skeleton teams to help run refugee camps housing more than 100,000 Sudanese refugees in this area alone. While the UN World Food Program said it would continue to feed the total of more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur who live in camps near the border with Sudan, the increased insecurity had forced it to suspend all non-emergency activities in eastern Chad.

Because of the continuing deterioration of the security situation, there was a UN system-wide decision that we would relocate all international and local staff from Guereda, Iriba and Bahai,” Helene Caux of the UN refugee agency UNHCR told Reuters by phone. She said more than 200 UN and NGO relief personnel would be moved over the next few days, by air or road.⁹

From Geneva the Associated Press reports (December 5, 2006):

Rising violence along Chad’s border with Sudan is forcing the United Nations to reduce staff in six camps to a bare minimum and cut back on programs for more than 100,000 Darfur refugees already living in precarious conditions, the global body’s refugee agency said Tuesday [December 5, 2006]. “The fragile lifeline to the refugees in eastern Chad is stretching even thinner,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees spokeswoman Jennifer Pagonis told reporters. []

Pagonis said UNHCR would keep a “minimum presence” in the field offices of Bahai, Iriba and Guereda, but would move most of its staff in those places to the main eastern town of Abeche or the capital of N’Djamena. She described an incident last week in Guereda in which four armed men broke into a UNHCR compound and threatening staff at gunpoint, before stealing two vehicles.

On Friday [December 1, 2006], clashes between rebels and the Chadian army 30 miles from the Sudanese border killed 130 people, a government spokesman said Tuesday. Rebels attacked Guereda and claimed that with the capture of the town, they now controlled an entire region in Chad, Wadi Fira.

The UN High Commission for Refugees reports in a December 1, 2006 press release on the scale of humanitarian withdrawals from eastern Chad:

A total of 145 humanitarian workers from various UN agencies and non-governmental organizations have been temporarily relocated from

the east to N'Djamena, via Abeche. Another 98 people are still registered to depart the town. Several humanitarian planes are scheduled today to continue the transfer. UNHCR is keeping essential staff in the region, which means we've reduced by about a third. At the same time, we're bringing in some specialists in logistics and supply to ensure that the vital aid lifeline to 218,000 refugees in 12 eastern camps near the border with Darfur continues, as well as for some 90,000 internally displaced Chadians.

But it is unclear how logisticians alone can surmount the problems posed by growing insecurity. The same UNHCR press release expresses concern regarding the accessibility of aid channels, and also reports on recent violence in the southern sector of eastern Chad:

Dozens of villages in southeastern Chad were burned and abandoned in November following a wave of inter-communal violence between Arabs and non-Arab tribes. The attacks resulted in the displacement of at least 15,000 people for the month around Goz Beida, Koukou Angarana and Koloy/Ade. In all, an estimated 90,000 Chadians have been displaced in the east over the past year.

The ongoing and thoroughly entrenched security risks to civilians in eastern Chad have very recently been highlighted yet again by human rights groups, most notably Amnesty International ("Chad: Civilians left unprotected as brutal Janjawid attacks reach 150 kilometres inside Chad," press release, December 1, 2006):

Amnesty International today published new evidence of the Chadian government failing to act as Janjawid from Darfur and Chad carry out increasingly brutal and extensive attacks on civilians in eastern Chad. The evidence was gathered by an Amnesty International delegation that has just returned from a two-week visit to Chad. Delegates interviewed victims of rape, torture and forced displacement, visited destroyed villages and met with the Chadian Prime Minister and other government officials. It provides irrefutable proof that the conflict and human rights crisis in Darfur has now become deeply entrenched in eastern Chad.

Although the deep failures of the Chadian government are rightly highlighted by Amnesty, we must bear in mind how fully the Khartoum regime supports the *Janjaweed* raiders, and that the same is true of the rebel groups that have diverted so much of Chad's military capabilities:

At the same time, women who have fled to internally displaced person camps told delegates of an increasing number of rapes by Janjawid, with the Chadian military and police failing to patrol in or around the camps. “We have seen a dramatic upsurge in ever more brutal attacks on civilians which have occurred further and further into Chad, yet the Chadian military and police are not even making a token effort to protect their own citizens. The government faces a real threat from the rebel forces. However, even when they have the means, they have still refused pleas for help from their own civilians,” said Alex Neve, member of the Amnesty International delegation.

Preliminary findings from the Amnesty International delegation to Chad include the:

[1] Spread of attacks on civilians by Janjawid from the border into areas well inside Chad including devastating attacks on the villages of Bandiakao, Badiya and Kerfi during the first two weeks of November, some 150 kilometres inside the country;

[2] Intensification of Janjawid attacks on civilians since the end of the rainy season in mid September—Amnesty International has collected the names of around 500 individuals killed in attacks in the Dar Sila region alone although the total number is much higher;

[3] Increasing brutality of attacks including murder, mutilation and the burning of victims alive, compared with previous attacks which mainly focused on stealing livestock and food supplies or scaring inhabitants into fleeing their villages;

[4] Growth of violence against women, including rape, in and around camps for internally displaced people with displaced men unable to accompany them out of fear of being killed and government forces refusing to patrol in or around the camps.

The full version of this report includes an analysis of conditions in Darfur that have precipitated this spillover of violence into Chad, and is available to read [here](#).

Human Security in Darfur and Eastern Chad: A Remorseless Deterioration

March 9, 2007

Despite desperate pleas from both civilians and aid organizations, in Darfur as well as in eastern Chad, security continues to deteriorate badly in the greater humanitarian theater—threatening lives, livelihoods, and all humanitarian operations. Nor is there any prospect of an adequate or timely international protection response to these deepening, inter-related security crises. Ethnically-targeted violence on both sides of the Chad/Darfur border, growing directly out of the Khartoum regime’s genocidal counterinsurgency war, has created a conflict-affected population of over 4.5 million human beings. Hundreds of thousands of these people will die in the coming months and years. A cataclysm of human destruction has begun that simply cannot be halted, though of course it might still be substantially mitigated.

For Darfur mortality as of August 2010, see **Annex III**.

Humanitarian access to these desperate populations is contracting at an alarming rate. As UN publication observes:

The humanitarian crisis in the Darfur-Chad-Central African Republic triangle has deteriorated to unprecedented levels in recent months, with increasing spillover from the conflict in Darfur to Chad and CAR.¹⁰

This deterioration is a direct result of what is now uncontrolled violence on the part of all combatants, but most conspicuously Khartoum’s regular military forces and its brutal *Janjaweed* militia allies. The desperate nature of the security issues facing humanitarians received some fleeting notice in January 2007 when 14 operational UN humanitarian organizations, as well as six prominent international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), made two compelling collective statements about how close they are to withdrawing from Darfur. They concluded that “the humanitarian community cannot indefinitely assure the survival of the population in Darfur if insecurity continues.”¹¹

Yet almost two months later security continues to deteriorate, even as the enfeebled and demoralized African Union force in Darfur remains the only source of protection for civilians and humanitarians. The AU force itself faces daily greater

threats from combatants on all sides, further attenuating its highly limited capacity.¹²

Why does the African Union remain, with full knowledge by the entire world community, the only source of security on the ground in Darfur? Why has no international force deployed to eastern Chad? There are finally as many answers as there are international actors of consequence, but all take final form in the unrelenting defiance on the part of Khartoum's *génocidaires*. This defiance, despite its conspicuous nature, is not honestly acknowledged: an international charade persists in which Khartoum is simply not credited for meaning what it says, even when those words are fully borne out by actions.

Rapid Security Deterioration in Eastern Chad

What must not be lost sight of amidst the overwhelming security crisis in Darfur is the equally dire situation for humanitarians working in eastern Chad. Moreover, President Idriss Déby has for political reasons reneged on an earlier commitment to allow an international military force to deploy to the Chad/Darfur border; he is now insisting that this be simply a police operation. Déby has also “refused to allow an advance team of military, police and civilian peacekeepers to visit the country,” according to UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hedi Annabi.¹³

A purely policing presence is not a tenable alternative and ensures that no force will be deploying without robust international pressure on Déby to accept the force outlined in February 2007 by Secretary-General Ban (approximately 11,000 troops and police). As Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Annabi recently emphasized: ““We need a military force that creates an environment in which the police can do their work.””¹⁴

The need for such a military and policing force could not be greater. As the BBC reported (February 16, 2007) from eastern Chad:

The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) says the killing tactics from neighbouring Darfur in Sudan have been transported to eastern Chad in full. [] The BBC's Orla Guerin, in eastern Chad, says at first the Janjaweed came from Sudan; later, locals joined in—neighbour killing neighbour. “We are seeing elements that closely resemble what we saw in Rwanda in the genocide in 1994 and I think we have an opportunity here to avoid such a tragedy from occurring again,” UNHCR's Matthew Conway said.

But the only way to avert the escalating violence and disruption of humanitarian aid is by enhancing security, and such security is nowhere in sight. From eastern

Chad, *The Telegraph* (UK) reports that “[a]id agencies work under constant threat,” while Nicolas de Torrente of Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) recently declared that MSF “had to pull international teams out of places that are too dangerous and move them back into camps and cities.”¹⁵

[MSF also issued a somewhat contradictory press release passing negative judgment on relief agencies that have pulled out of Chad due to the volatile security situation; for more on this point, see the [full version](#) of this report.]

Human Security in Darfur and Eastern Chad: An Overview, Part 1

June 11, 2007

Almost as if to mirror Darfur itself, news reporting and other accounts of the vast crisis in western Sudan and eastern Chad have become less and less coherent. Attempts at synthesizing what we know, from the broadest range of sources, are virtually non-existent, particularly in assessing the key issues of civilian and humanitarian protection. As a consequence, global assessments continue to be presented primarily in the form of almost incomprehensibly large statistics coming from the UN and humanitarian organizations: a staggering 4.7 million conflicted-affected persons in Darfur and eastern Chad; more than 2.5 million displaced from their homes, most losing everything, with no prospect of return in sight; a million human beings beyond all reach of humanitarian assistance; and hundreds of thousands who have already perished. Ominously, the hunger season began early this year; UNICEF and others report malnutrition rates in Darfur that are of concern; and Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports highly alarming malnutrition rates from eastern Chad and a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation.

Indeed, in many ways the security crisis and humanitarian conditions in eastern Chad are worse than in Darfur. There are presently approximately half a million conflict-affected persons in eastern Chad: 240,000 Darfuri refugees; 150,000 Chadian Internally Displaced Persons; and over 100,000 conflict-affected people clinging desperately to their homes and villages. Repeated incursions by Khartoum-backed *Janjaweed* militia forces have become the catalyst for growing indigenous ethnic violence. Khartoum's support for both the *Janjaweed* and Chadian rebels seeking to overthrow President Idriss Déby has led to a highly destabilized situation that extends ever more deeply into eastern Chad.

In June 2007, MSF issued a particularly dire warning:

In [eastern] Chad 150,000 IDPs are caught up in a growing humanitarian crisis. Although an MSF survey has confirmed the emergency situation, assistance is still largely insufficient and MSF is coming up against numerous obstacles to increasing its activities. In eastern Chad, repeated deadly attacks on villages over the past 18 months have forced tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. Grouped together in camps where security is not always guaranteed, they live in basic huts and lack food, water and access to medical care.¹⁶

Although MSF has previously criticized other aid organizations for not working

more aggressively to provide humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad, the terrible reality is that insecurity is simply intolerably great in many areas of the very long border region with Darfur, even for MSF. For example, on May 24, 2007, workers for the UN's World Food Program recently came under violent attack near Iriba, forcing the organization to suspend operations in eastern Chad, where WFP "supplies food to three UN-run camps sheltering 56,000 Sudanese refugees who have fled fighting in Darfur."¹⁷

Indeed, so great is insecurity that many Chadians have actually fled to Darfur:

Some 20,000 Chadians already have crossed to Darfur [from eastern Chad] since the end of 2005, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) said. The migration has occurred despite unabated violence and human rights abuses committed in Darfur by government-backed janjaweed militias and rebels. [] The Chadians were fleeing "janjaweed-style attacks, some of them by domestic groups, some of them believed to have come across the border from Darfur," [UNHCR spokesman Ron] Redmond said.¹⁸

Shortly after the visit by UN humanitarian aid chief Holmes, word emerged of an especially violent, and terribly revealing, attack on civilians. The *Los Angeles Times* reported (April 11, 2007):

In the latest sign that violence plaguing Darfur is spilling into neighboring Chad, more than 200 Chadians were feared dead in an attack against two remote farming villages near the Sudanese border, the UN's refugee agency said Tuesday [April 10, 2007]. Humanitarian workers who reached the villages of Tiero and Marena on Sunday [April 8, 2007] found mass graves, decomposing bodies, scores of dead livestock and hundreds of torched huts, some still smoldering from the March 31, [2007] attack.

The attacks were among the deadliest to hit southeastern Chad in 18 months, when violence from the Darfur region of western Sudan began spilling over the border. The death toll is estimated between 200 and 400. Officials said exact figures are unclear because many victims had been buried in common graves by the time humanitarian workers arrived.

Commenting on the spreading ethnically-targeted violence even before the terrible events at Tiero and Marena, Matthew Conway of UNHCR declared: "We are

seeing elements that closely resemble what we saw in Rwanda in the genocide of 1994.”¹⁹

Yet as Amnesty International declares in the Darfur section of its 2007 Annual Report on Human Rights (May 2007), the Sudanese government “took no action to halt cross-border Janjawid attacks against targeted ethnic groups in Chad, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians and tens of thousands of displacements during the first half of the year. Attacks across the border resumed in October, in which some 500 civilians were unlawfully killed, many more were raped, thousands were driven from their homes, and villages were destroyed.”

Military actions by Khartoum’s Regular Forces

In Darfur, Khartoum’s regular military forces (the Sudan Armed Forces [SAF]) are also constantly reported as attacking civilian targets, both on the ground and from the air.

At the same time, Eastern Chad is increasingly viewed by Khartoum as a source of support for the non-signatory rebel groups, and for this reason we should not be surprised that the regime’s Antonov “bombers,” even its helicopter gunships (according to Human Rights Watch), have also targeted civilians in Chad:

Last Thursday [March 22, 2007], a plane described by witnesses as a Sudanese Antonov, bombed areas north and south of the northeastern Chadian town of Bahai. The air strikes included the area around Lake Cariari, several kilometres from the Oure Cassoni refugee camp. Oure Cassoni hosts nearly 27,000 Sudanese refugees. While no refugees were injured, several Chadian civilians and two humanitarian workers from an international NGO were wounded.

This is not the first time that air strikes have occurred near Oure Cassoni, which is only 5 km from the Sudanese border. Air strikes were reported over a two-day period in early January 2007 and in October 2006. UNHCR has been seeking agreement from the refugees and Chadian authorities to move the camp further from the border. These two recent incidents again highlight the precariousness of the security situation in the region for refugees, for displaced Chadians, for the local population and for humanitarian workers.²⁰

There is no end in sight to ethnically-targeted violence in Darfur, nor indeed to its spread into eastern Chad and Central African Republic.²¹

Human Security in Darfur and Eastern Chad: An Overview, Part 2

Part Two of this analysis undertakes to survey the implications of the ongoing military violence in Darfur and eastern Chad for both aid operations as well as the approximately 4.7 million conflict-affected civilians in the great humanitarian theater of Darfur and eastern Chad. Many of these affected civilians are now completely dependent upon international humanitarian aid, even as approximately 1 million civilians are beyond the reach of all assistance.

It is important to realize that these staggering numbers have continued to rise as violent displacement proceeds apace in both Darfur and eastern Chad. Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 27 (DHP 27) finds that “between January and March 2007, over 110,000 people have been newly displaced through Darfur, some 80,000 in South Darfur alone” (page 3). DHP 27 also finds that the number of Darfur civilians “in need of humanitarian assistance has increased by 278,000 with respect to the January [2007] report.” This reflects both movement into the traditional “hunger gap” between spring planting and fall harvest, as well as “[significant erosion] of the population’s coping mechanisms.” The total conflict-affected population in Darfur in need of humanitarian assistance now reaches almost to 4.2 million. Another 500,000 civilians in eastern Chad are conflicted-affected and in need of humanitarian assistance.

In eastern Chad, the figure for Darfuri refugees and Chadian Internally Displaced Persons is approximately 400,000. Total human displacement exceeds 2.5 million, with most of these people having lost almost everything in the violence that forced them from their homes and lands. And displacement relentlessly continues to the present, more than two months after the reporting period for DHP 27 (January through March 2007).

At the end of April 2007, Oxfam/UK, Save the Children/Spain, and Mercy Corps withdrew from the Um Dhukun area in West Darfur. Coming in the wake of violent attacks on aid workers in the area, this action immediately affected 100,000 civilians, including refugees from Chad and Central African Republic.²² Many of these people will be forced to move.²³

A Central African Affair: Chad Insurgency Highlights Ongoing Darfur Genocide

First appeared as web column with the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, February 7, 2008

Amidst the ominous uncertainties created by the Chadian rebel assault on N’Djamena, Chad’s capital city in the far west of this vast country, one reality is all too clear: in eastern Chad, more than 400,000 displaced Chadians and Darfuri refugees confront an extremely dangerous future. If humanitarian assistance is cut off, many thousands will die. As of this writing a number of UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations are withdrawing personnel. Both food and critical non-food items (medicine, shelter materials, resources for clean water and sanitation) all come from the west, and this long and tenuous life-line could easily be snapped by continued violence in and around N’Djamena—or along the road stretching hundreds of miles to the most affected regions in the east.

Khartoum, which has long supplied and given sanctuary to the Chadian rebel groups, hopes to topple President Idriss Déby and install a much more pliant regime—one that will in the near term forestall the European Union force (EUFOR) that had finally begun deployment to protect civilians and humanitarians in eastern Chad. Khartoum is determined to prevent a militarily capable force from deploying to its western border, and the timing of the rebel attack on N’Djamena was dictated by the impending movement of European Union forces.

But the fate of Darfur itself and its more than 4 million conflict-affected civilians also looks daily more ominous. There is no longer a “border” between those in Chad who face violence and humanitarian collapse and those in Darfur who face the same threats. Just as in Chad EUFOR has waited too long to deploy (it was to have begun operations in late October/early November after muddy roads from the preceding rainy season had dried), so the UN and African Union have moved much too slowly in attempting to deploy their “hybrid” security force in Darfur. And they have too often refused to acknowledge Khartoum’s resolute policy of obstructing this UN-authorized peace support operation.

More than six months after UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized a force of 26,000 civilian police and troops to protect Darfuri noncombatants, as well as the humanitarian operations on which they depend, insecurity has only continued to deepen, bringing many aid organizations to the brink of withdrawal. More than a year and a half after the signing of the ill-conceived Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006, violence is a great deal more chaotic and more deeply

threatening. In recent weeks both UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guhenno have stressed that insecurity has reached unprecedented levels.

The UN-authorized force is supposed to replace a badly demoralized, undermanned and under-equipped African Union force. But the UN/African Union “hybrid” force (known as UNAMID) has managed to deploy no significant increases of personnel or resources—nothing that can offer real protection. As a consequence, at any given moment between 500,000 and 1 million human beings are completely beyond the reach of humanitarian efforts, and at least as many have only tenuous access to food, clean water, sanitary facilities, and primary health care. If insecurity does force aid organizations to abandon Darfur, a possibility they stress both publicly and privately, human destruction will be catastrophic within a population weakened by a genocidal counterinsurgency campaign that has now entered its sixth year.

What accounts for this unconscionable delay of a UN-authorized peace support mission, with Chapter 7 auspices? Unsurprisingly—and now increasingly publicly acknowledged by UN diplomats—the answer lies in defiant obstructionism by the National Islamic Front (NIF/NCP) regime in Khartoum (which has expediently and euphemistically renamed itself the National Congress Party). Though notionally the senior member of a Sudanese “Government of National Unity,” the Khartoum security cabal represents only ruthless survivalism, and is animated only by a determination to retain its stranglehold on Sudanese national wealth and power. But the NIF/NCP has extremely limited domestic political support; their confident obstruction of international efforts to halt what has become a grim “genocide by attrition” in Darfur must be explained in other terms. And here the key is Chinese support for the regime—support of longstanding that has taken economic, military, and diplomatic form.

To be sure, the Arab League—Egypt in particular—has been supportive of Khartoum, as has the Organization of the Islamic Conference. But to survive international pressure, especially by the US, to flout with disdain Security Council resolutions, and to thrive economically despite the crushing burden of its more than \$25 billion in external debt, Khartoum has depended upon Beijing. Beijing has abstained on, or blocked through a threatened veto, virtually every action the Security Council sought to take prior to passage of Resolution 1769. China did finally vote for this resolution, but only after significantly weakening its mandate and insisting that there be no sanctions threat against Khartoum, even in the event of non-compliance with the resolution.

This insulating of Khartoum from international pressure is longstanding and

enormously consequential. In August 2006, for example, before the violent factionalizing of the Darfur rebel movement, and before the security conditions on the ground had reached anything approaching the current chaos, the Security Council passed Resolution 1706. This authorized the deployment of 22,500 civilian police and troops, with a robust mandate that included protecting civilians and humanitarians, as well as staunching the flow of genocidal violence into neighboring eastern Chad and Central African Republic. With Chapter 7 authority and rapid deployment, this force could have halted the long and continuing slide toward complete anarchy, saved tens of thousands of lives, and prevented much of the current spillover of violence into Chad. China agreed to abstain on the resolution, as opposed to vetoing it outright, but only because it had succeeded in inserting language that “invited” the consent of the Khartoum regime. The invitation was of course contemptuously rejected, and for the first time in the history of UN peacekeeping, an authorized force did not deploy. China had done more than enough to convince Khartoum that it could defy the international community with impunity.

We see this same sense of impunity in the regime’s response to indictments from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Resolution 1593 (March 2005) referred atrocity crimes committed in Darfur to the ICC, despite China’s abstention on this vote. In spring 2007 the ICC issued its first indictments, charging a *Janjaweed* militia leader, Ali Kushyb, and a mid-level NIF/NCP official, Ahmed Haroun, with a broad range of crimes against humanity. In response Khartoum has spared no opportunity to express its contempt for the ICC and its warrants. Indeed, Haroun—who was deeply complicit in many of the most brutal genocidal efforts of 2003-04—has been promoted: he serves as State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and as a member of a team selected by Khartoum to “investigate” human rights abuses in Darfur. Most troublingly, he is the regime’s liaison with the UN/African Union force (UNAMID) now attempting to deploy to Darfur.

In December 2007 the UN Security Council President (Italy) attempted to pass a non-binding “Presidential Statement” supporting the ICC special prosecutor on Darfur, Luis Moreno-Ocampo. China insisted on eviscerating the statement to the point of vacuousness, and the measure was quietly dropped. This represented not only a serious blow to the struggling ICC but worked to reassure Khartoum yet again that China would allow no serious action to be taken. Similarly, when Khartoum deliberately, and with clear premeditation, attacked a UNAMID transport convoy on January 7—a shocking event, and one meant to intimidate peace support personnel throughout Darfur—China led the way in weakening what amounted to a tepid Security Council threat.

Why is China so determined to protect a regime whose genocidal counterinsurgency in Darfur has left hundreds of thousands dead, more than 2.5 million

displaced into overcrowded camps, and two-thirds of the pre-war population of the province dependent on humanitarian aid operations that will collapse rapidly without a fundamental change in the security dynamic? Most of the answer lies in China's dominant role within Sudan's oil exploration and production consortia, which lie in southern Sudan and along the north/south administrative border imposed by colonial rulers Great Britain and Egypt. A net importer of oil since 1995, China has seen its petroleum thirst grow as rapidly as its economy—over 10% annually over the past decade. Sudan is China's premier source of offshore oil production (without a close second), and this does much to insulate the Chinese economy from the effects of rapid rises in crude oil supplies. For more than a decade Beijing has looked at Sudan, and its many marginalized and impoverished regions, solely through the eyes of Khartoum's interests—and its own interests in crude oil production that now runs to approximately 500,000 barrels per day.

China has also more than willingly responded to Khartoum's determination to acquire the means to wage war on its own people. During the time of burgeoning oil development, China has been the regime's leading provider of arms and arms technology. With China's assistance, Khartoum acquired not only the weapons it used during the decades-long war in southern Sudan—including tanks, artillery, and military aircraft—but those that have been introduced into Darfur. Despite an arms embargo on Darfur, per UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (March 2005), a UN Panel of Experts on Darfur has repeatedly found that Khartoum completely ignores the embargo. In turn, Amnesty International has reported that among these arms are weapons and military supplies of Chinese manufacture. Unsurprisingly, China abstained on Resolution 1591; and, as it has on many similar occasions, China also made clear that it would not countenance sanctions against Khartoum, even in the event the regime flagrantly refused to comply with UN demands.

A grim syllogism governs the fate of the people of Darfur, and to a very considerable extent the displaced and conflict-affected people of eastern Chad: Either the international community devises a strategy for bringing pressure on Khartoum to negotiate in good faith and abide by agreements signed, or ethnically-targeted human destruction will continue throughout much of Sudan. Here we should bear in mind the fate of the much-touted north/south "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" (January 2005). More than three years after its arduous consummation, the CPA has been serially abrogated by Khartoum in ways that have made the resumption of war a terrifyingly likely outcome.

The regime has also failed to abide by the various terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement, most significantly on security issues, but also in funding compensation and reconstruction promised in the agreement. An especially revealing example of the regime's attitude toward its commitments is the unilateral "cease-fire"

it declared on October 27, 2007 at the start of the doomed peace talks in Sirte, Libya. Senior presidential advisor Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e, who holds the Darfur portfolio, promised a halt to all offensive military activities; the very next day rebel groups reported that the regime's Antonov bombers attacked civilian targets in West Darfur, attacks confirmed privately by the UN and African Union.

Darfur in Extremis: Khartoum Resumes Civilian Destruction in West Darfur

February 19, 2008

Over the past few days, the Khartoum regime has resumed the brutal campaign north of el-Geneina that began on February 8, 2008. Many tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and more than 12,000 have been forced to flee to Chad, where efforts to provide humanitarian assistance are encountering a range of severe challenges.

Meanwhile, a good deal more evidence is emerging indicating the extent of Khartoum's involvement in supporting Chadian rebels groups in their attack on N'Djamena (February 1 to 3, 2008) in an effort to topple the regime of Idriss Déby. Regional sources indicate that Khartoum's coordination and supplying of the rebel groups was extremely extensive. The coup attempt by these Khartoum-backed rebels groups has left much of Eastern Chad in a highly precarious position, further threatening Darfuri refugees as well as Chadian displaced persons

Even as the scale of previous town and village destruction in Darfur is emerging more fully, tens of thousands of civilians are moving or preparing to move in the face of renewed ground and air onslaught—and will seek refuge in Chad. At the same time, Khartoum-supplied *Janjaweed* militia forces are coordinating with the regime's regular forces, and again engaging in the brutal predations that have displaced so many in the course of the Darfur genocide.²⁴

Khartoum's Military Offensive Spills into Chad

Even beyond Sudan's borders, the effects of Khartoum's current military offensive against civilians and rebels are extremely dire, and threaten to push Chad and Sudan closer to war. But the consequences for civilians are most conspicuous. The UN High Commission for Refugees declared today (February 19, 2008) in Geneva:

The United Nations refugee agency said Tuesday it had withdrawn a team caring for refugees from the Chad/Darfur border after fresh aerial bombing in the conflict-riven Sudanese province. "Aerial bombardment overnight and this morning in West Darfur, Sudan, close to the border with Chad, has forced UNHCR to withdraw its team caring for newly arrived refugees in the Birak area [just over the border in Chad] away from the insecure border," spokeswoman Jennifer Pagonis told journalists. [] "More arrivals are still expected and with the fresh

bombing we can expect more displacement in West Darfur,” Pagonis said.²⁵

Confidential sources report that the bombing near Birak has been extremely intense, and the situation on the ground is highly unstable, with the possibility of a dramatic downturn.

At the same time, the Chadian regime of the increasingly embattled Idriss Déby has refused to give permission to move these newest and most vulnerable Darfuri refugees to safer camps further away from the border:

On 11 February [2008] Chadian Prime Minister Nouradine Delwa Kas-sir Coumakoye said the government [of Chad] would refuse entry to any new Sudanese refugees. “We cannot admit any more,” the prime minister said. He also called on the international community to move all 240,000 Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad to another country. “It is because of them that we have the problems we have today,” he said referring to the current armed rebellion.²⁶

This is at once unspeakably callous and deeply disingenuous. The Déby regime knows full well that there is no “other country” to which the Darfur refugees can be moved; and it knows just as well that to deny entry to refugees from the latest fighting in Darfur is to consign these people to intolerable suffering and an unconscionable number of deaths.

The consequences of failing to engage forcefully with Chad in the context of the Darfur crisis, with a clear set of political, military, and humanitarian demands are all too clear. And they reveal the poverty of international—and especially French—efforts to deal with the complex claims of legitimate civil society opposition, the threats posed by military insurrection and a “hot war” with Sudan, and the overwhelmingly urgent needs of more than 500,000 refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Eastern Chad. French support for Déby during the recent Chadian rebel attack on N’Djamena is looking more and more like a resumption of the “Francafrique” policy of supporting African dictators on a wholly expedient basis.

At the same time that the Chadian government was officially denying access to Darfuri refugees, the UN High Commission for Refugees reported:

Efforts by the UN Refugee Agency [UNHCR] in eastern Chad to move newly-arrived Sudanese refugees from West Darfur to camps away from the volatile border were blocked by an unknown armed group, according to an agency spokeswoman. “This is deeply concerning and we are

making every effort with the Chadian authorities to get these refugees moved quickly,” UNHCR spokesperson Jennifer Pagonis said at a press briefing in Geneva on 15 February [2008]. Pagonis said 70 percent of the 8,000 new arrivals are women and children. The refugees are scattered near the border, east of the town of Guereda. They are “exhausted” and “in very poor condition,” she added. “Women report being raped. Children have been separated from their families.”

The UNHCR spokeswomen did not say whether the combatants who stopped aid workers from moving the new refugees were acting under orders of the government. “They gave no reason for their actions but it was clear the relocation would not take place,” Pagonis said. She said the UNHCR representative in Chad was currently at the border, “trying to find a solution to this problem which is leaving the refugees extremely exposed and vulnerable...The area is highly insecure with roaming armed groups posing a real threat to the refugees and aid workers,” Pagonis said.²⁷

Déby must be given a strong, credible, and immediate warning about the consequences for his international standing if he fails to facilitate both refugee accommodation and humanitarian movements. Moreover, Chadian authorities should expedite resumed movement of humanitarian supplies into Eastern Chad, as critical shortfalls are developing. Oxfam, for example, has again warned about the water crisis that is impending if fuel for pumping stations is not delivered soon. This threatens more than 100,000 civilians in refugee camps where the organization works. Addressing European foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on February 18, 2008, “Oxfam said supply routes to the camps [in Eastern Chad] had been closed and that only two weeks’ worth of fuel supplies for vital water plants was left. “We have all the elements for a huge humanitarian crisis rapidly developing in Chad,” said Nick Roseveare, Oxfam’s director for West Africa...Oxfam said camps in eastern Chad were unable to cope with a fresh wave of thousands of refugees fleeing violence in Darfur.²⁸

With these developments as context, the belatedly deploying EUFOR must secure the humanitarian corridor between N’Djamena and Eastern Chad as rapidly as possible, and provide near term improvement in security in the most threatened areas along the Chad/Darfur border, especially north of el-Geneina and in the Goz Beida area to the south.

UNCHR: “Situation Report as of 20 March 2008” (Chad)

Key sources of data and information about the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Chad are the UN High Commission for Refugee’s (UNHCR) “Situation Report as of 20 March 2008” [Chad Sit Rep] and a widely reported interview by Kingsley Amaning, UN humanitarian coordinator in Chad (March 2008):

Eastern Chad “now hosts a total of 250,000 refugees from Darfur, 57,000 from Central African Republic, and 180,000 internally displaced Chadians. In addition, between 700,000 and 800,000 resident of eastern Chad have been reeling from incursions by Chadian rebels which have made their communities very vulnerable.”²⁹

[Amaning] said 250,000 Sudanese refugees were crammed into camps in Chad in areas that normally sustains 20,000 people, putting pressure on water and other essential services.”³⁰

The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 13,000 refugees fled from Khartoum’s January/February 2008 military offensive in West Darfur; many refugees ended up in the highly insecure Birak area and could not be properly accessed by aid organization.³¹

UNHCR reported in the same March 14 press release: “[Darfuri] refugees interviewed this week said they had buried bags of grain in their villages in West Darfur before fleeing. Some had returned to their villages to find that their supplies had been discovered and destroyed by the Janjaweed militia, leaving them with nothing and forcing them to return to Chad.”

[A brief comment on EUFOR: This European Union force of approximately 3,700 personnel is meant to provide security for Eastern Chad and northeastern Central Africa Republic, as well as to support the UN Mission for the Central African Republic and Chad (MINCURCAT), which will consist of 350 police and military liaison personnel. The mandates of the two are essentially the same: MINCURCAT is to protect “refugees, displaced persons, and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas”; EUFOR is to take “all necessary measures within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic to protect civilians, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of UN personnel.”

The best and most detailed assessment of the relation between Chad and Darfur comes from Jerome Tubiana, “Echo Effects: Chadian Instability and the Darfur Conflict.”³² As Tubiana points out, it will be difficult for EUFOR to distinguish

itself from the previous French military presence in Chad (Operation Epervier, on the ground since 1986). France is presently contributing the bulk of troops and military equipment to EUFOR. Moreover, the assessment of EUFOR from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is highly critical, suggesting that the force is only approximately one quarter the size it should be, given its mandate and the areas for which it responsible. Although EUFOR deployment has finally begun—it was originally slated to deploy in October/November 2007, following the rainy season in Eastern Chad—there is no clear evidence that it will be adequate in size or perceived by the Chadian rebels as suitably neutral.]

Darfur's Forgotten Refugees and the Humanitarian Crisis in Chad

First appeared with [ENOUGH](#), May 18, 2010

Ongoing human suffering and destruction in Darfur have been largely eclipsed both by recent national elections in Sudan and by growing, if belated, international attention to the imperiled southern self-determination referendum (slated for January 9, 2011). Even more completely obscured by recent events in Sudan, however, is the continuing humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad.

Refugees from Central African Republic, internally displaced Chadians, and Darfuri refugees together make up a population of approximately 500,000 civilians, almost completely dependent upon international aid. Half this population has come from the east, fleeing the killing fields of Darfur and the predations of Khartoum's brutal *Janjaweed* militias, and its regular military forces. Recently the fleeing has begun again, just as Chadian President Idriss Déby is preparing to expel the U.N. force tasked with providing security in the region. Once more, the U.N. and the international community are acquiescing before the supremely callous demands of a ruthless regime.

A great many Darfuris fled the early attacks of 2003-05, and the refugee population in eastern Chad grew rapidly; many more fled subsequently, fearing further attacks and the ongoing, ethnically-targeted destruction of livelihoods. Perversely, in Chad, they again became the victims of genocidal assault. A January 2007 report from Human Rights Watch titled "[They Came Here to Kill Us': Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad](#)" remains our best contemporaneous account of violence perpetrated against Darfuri refugees and other civilians. In October 2006, Khartoum's military aircraft "bombed villages in eastern Chad...[as] part of a broader pattern of indiscriminate bombing attacks against civilians in Darfur." During its month-long field investigation, HRW also uncovered evidence "linking some attacks against civilians in eastern Chad with known *Janjaweed* militia commanders or with Sudanese government paramilitary forces known to include many *Janjaweed* militia members."

Broader insecurity and more opportunistic violence came quickly in the wake of these attacks on civilians, as the growing refugee population required an increasingly comprehensive humanitarian response. Seven years after war began in Darfur, this humanitarian response remains extremely vulnerable and lacks adequate resources.

This is the context in which we must understand recent reports of intense fighting in West Darfur, particularly in the Jebel Moon area, between Khartoum's forces

and those of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM. Although there has been only vague confirmation from the U.N./A.U. “hybrid” peacekeeping force, or UNAMID, a range of reports and statements from a variety of actors suggest that JEM has indeed lost its most significant military redoubt, and that during the fighting many more civilians have been displaced. Radio Dabanga [reports](#) from Kou-noungo refugee camp that officials for the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, or UNHCR, are preparing for approximately 2,500 civilians who have already fled to Birak in eastern Chad. How many more are on the way is unclear.

These attacks are reminiscent of a major military offensive by Khartoum in the same region in early 2008. At the time, UNHCR reported:

[U]p to 12,000 “terrified” refugees from Sudan’s Darfur region have fled across the border to neighboring Chad after the latest air strikes by the Sudanese military and thousands more may be on their way. (...) Most of the refugees so far are men, [UNHCR spokeswoman Helene Caux] said. But the arrivals are telling UNHCR that “thousands of women and children are on their way” to Chad, she added.³³

Now, in the wake of rapprochement between N’Djamena and Khartoum, Déby is insisting that the U.N. force that followed an emergency European deployment to eastern Chad be removed. MINURCAT, as the U.N. mission is known, will have until July 15 to withdraw 1,400 troops, according to a report from U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon; the remaining 1,900 must be withdrawn by October 15. This is an outrageous assertion of national sovereignty, and will put at dramatically increased risk both civilians and humanitarians, especially humanitarian convoys—a [particular concern of the U.N. World Food Program](#).

Déby claims that his forces are capable of providing the necessary security; but this is patently false, even as Déby has shown no inclination in the past to use what military and police resources he has to protect refugees or aid operations. Much greater diplomatic pressure—especially from France, the U.S., and the U.N.—should have been exerted to forestall a development that clearly augurs near-term catastrophe. Yet again, before our very eyes, the people of Darfur have been abandoned.

IRIN Report: “Chad: The strains of long-term displacement”

IRIN, Goz-Beida, July 13, 2012

Djabal refugee camp in eastern Chad, where some residents have stayed for nearly a decade after fleeing violence in neighbouring Sudan, illustrates some of the family and social problems engendered by displacement and dependency. “Before, in Darfur [Sudan], both men and women used to work, but virtually no one has a job here,” Achtar Abubakr Ibrahim, a women’s refugee leader in Djabal, told IRIN. “The men found themselves jobless, the women became dependent on the jobless men and this created frustration and anger, so the men started battering the women.” At Djabal camp, which has about 18,000 refugees, groups of men sit in the shade talking for hours on end, while the women do casual jobs, if possible, in addition to their household chores of taking care of the children, and fetching water and firewood.

“The women decided to work. They went to town to do brick-making for their children[’s sake], but the men want to misuse [the earnings], leading to violence,” said Achtar.

“The women have hustled and found something, the men are idle and it affects their self-esteem. Their egos are battered,” an aid official, who preferred anonymity, told IRIN. “In some cases, the man has sold the food ration in exchange for alcohol or a mobile phone, so on food aid distribution day the woman has to secretly take along the ration card,” said the official, recalling a case in which a man had sold the family’s food ration to buy a phone. “The woman was screaming, saying we are going to eat a mobile phone for a month.” Despite efforts to promote self-sufficiency, Darfuri refugees in Chad continue to depend almost entirely on humanitarian assistance for their basic needs, notes a June 2011 [report](#) by the US Cultural Orientation Centre. Access to arable land remains generally non-existent for these refugees, says [ACT Alliance](#), an alliance of 125 churches and related organizations that work together in humanitarian assistance, advocacy and development.

Family breakdowns

Family breakdowns compound the refugees’ plight. “It is amazing how almost all people [couples] who left Darfur married, have divorced,” said Djabal camp’s Achtar. There are many widowed women, young mothers and divorcees in eastern Chad refugee camps, says Magua Kanja, country director of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society ([HIAS](#)) in Chad. “They marry today, tomorrow they are divorced, yet they have children to take care of.” HIAS is working in six refugee camps in

the east. Eastern Chad is home to about [264,000 Sudanese refugees](#) in 12 camps. For those exposed to gender-based violence (GBV) access to health care and other psychosocial support is a challenge. “The community does not want to encourage such reporting, they want to solve it locally. The culture does not encourage sorting out issues outside the family. If you take the [battered] woman to a hospital, other people will know,” explained Kanja. “HIAS and other partners operating in the camps make every effort to sort out GBV cases in the presence of the family.” For refugee women, many of them traumatized by having to flee, their family is so important to them that the idea of leaving their husbands, even if there was GBV, is not a realistic option. HIAS is training some of the refugee women in skills such as bread- and soap-making through the organization’s community centres “instead of just offering psychological support in the form of counselling, then accompanying them to hospital to seek medical care,” said Kanja. “We are preparing them such that should they go back to their country of origin; they will have some skills even as donor funding also reduces.”

Rape risk

Refugee women are more affected by violence than any other population of women in the world and are at risk of rape or other forms of sexual violence, says a Denver University [study](#). “The setting in which a refugee lives, often a refugee camp, forces her to rely on others in a way that makes her increasingly vulnerable to violence. For example, if she is no longer able to contribute to the family income, she becomes dependent on male support, increasing the likelihood that she will endure abuse in order to meet her needs.” “Refugees—particularly women and children—can experience violence during their journey as well as an increase in GBV when in crowded camp conditions, stress from difficult experiences, and a lack of protection and resources,” adds Jaya Vadlamudi, a senior communications officer with International Medical Corps ([IMC](#)).

In the five refugee camps where the IMC operates in eastern Chad, between January 2011 and March 2012 GBV cases represented 1.7 percent of total consultations, early marriage 20 percent, physical violence 35 percent, domestic violence 33 percent, and rape 11 percent, said Vadlamudi. IMC provides medical services for survivors of sexual assault, including essential drugs ([post-exposure prophylaxis](#) to reduce the likelihood of HIV infection, and emergency contraception to prevent unwanted pregnancies). “We take a holistic approach to all of our GBV programmes so that we not only treat the physical and psychological aftermath of abuse, but also prevent future cases through community education and outreach,” he added.

Early marriage and GBV

At Djabal refugee camp, for example, early marriage is prevalent. “It is difficult convincing people [in the refugee camp] that this is a form of GBV,” said Achtar who got married at the age of 15 and is a mother of 12 at only 37 years old; one of her sons, aged 17, is already a husband. “Family planning is sort of a taboo subject in the region, people don’t talk about it,” said an aid official. “It is difficult because of cultural reasons and the lack of male involvement. They want many children. It is a sign of fertility.” There have been recorded cases of sexual violence against eastern Chad refugee women out looking for firewood. A UN Refugee Agency [initiative](#) to bring solar-powered lights and fuel-efficient stoves to some of the camps over the next three years, aims to address some of the security and environmental challenges. “We have to walk the whole day sometimes [looking for firewood]. We used to be attacked in 2006-2007 but these attacks have reduced,” said Achtar.

Eastern Chad is recovering after years of a proxy war between it and Sudan, following a January 2010 agreement between the two governments, but attacks on civilians and other forms of criminality continue. Since 2011, the UN-supported Chadian security force, *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* (DIS), has been working to provide security in and around refugee camps and to protect convoys of returning displaced people. Since the withdrawal of the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) in 2010, the presence of DIS has been essential in order to generate respect for the law, prevent the recruitment of children into armed groups, and reduce the number of incidents of sexual assault and GBV in and around refugee camps. In the first half of 2010, at least 250 general complaints of sexual abuse and GBV were reported to DIS in the east, according to a [2011 Human Rights Watch Report](#).

Radio Dabanga: “Government hails success of Darfur conference amid criticism by IDPs and rebels”

Radio Dabanga, el-Fasher, July 13, 2012

The government-led Darfur conference stressed the necessity of establishing security in the region and integrating the still active rebel movements into society by signing the Doha Agreement. With the Justice and Equality Movement’s notable rejection of the peace agreement this will be hard to achieve. IDPs attending the conference complained that it failed to address the root causes of the conflict in Darfur. During the closing speech of the Darfur conference on Thursday in El Fasher the speaker of the Sudanese Parliament, Ahmed Ibrahim Al Tahir, confirmed the government’s commitment to implement the Doha peace agreement. The agreement aims at bringing security and stability to Darfur. Al Tahir declared that amnesty would be given to all Darfurians who previously raised arms against the government. Taj Al Din Bashir Nyam, the Darfur Regional Authority’s Minister of Reconstruction and Development, read the recommendations made during the conference. The main recommendation stressed the necessity of combining justice and reconciliation in accordance with national laws, local customs and traditions. A second concerned the establishment of regional workshops in Darfur to discuss the issue of voluntary repatriation in consultation with refugees and displaced people.

A displaced person from West Darfur attending the conference described the recommendations as void. He told Radio Dabanga “they don’t change the facts on the ground. There is still no security in the region and no funds to rebuild Darfur, plus, there are new settlers occupying our lands.” He added “the recommendations do not address the root causes of the conflict or the issue of displacement.” He described the Doha Document as a failure. During a press conference the spokesman of the military council of the Justice and Liberation Movement, Musa Sherib Bari, announced that the movement boycotted the conference because of the crimes committed by Tijane Sese since the signing of the Doha agreement. A paper was presented during the conference revealing that there are eleven kinds of weapons entering Darfur. There are no regulations regarding the distribution of weapons in Darfur. When the paper was presented during the session the government confiscated it.

The Commissioner of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Salaf Al Din Salih, told Radio Dabanga that the estimated costs of achieving the disarmament of popular defense movements and militias total 50 million dollars. Omda Saleh, a displaced person from camp Kalma in South Darfur who attended the con-

ference told Radio Dabanga that there was a general consensus towards voluntary repatriation, providing that the return areas are secure. He said that “a comprehensive peace is the only solution to the conflict in Darfur. This will not happen as long as non-signatories are not included in the process.”

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
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Notes

- 1 The [full version](#) of this report includes a section on Khartoum’s war on humanitarian assistance in Darfur.
- 2 Deutsche Presse Agentur [Paris] November 15, 2006.
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- 4 Reuters [N’Djamena] November 26, 2006.
- 5 VOA [Geneva] November 25, 2006.
- 6 Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad,” February 2006, page 2.
- 7 HRW, “Darfur Bleeds,” page 11.
- 8 UN World Food Program press release, December 5, 2006.
- 9 Reuters [N’Djamena, Chad] December 4, 2006.
- 10 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Office for Central and East Africa, “Humanitarian Newsmaker,” Volume 1, Issue 1, March 2007.
- 11 Joint Statement on Darfur, January 18, 2007; Source: UN High Commission for Refugees.

- 12 See the [full version](#) of this report for more on the AU and examples of attacks on aid organizations in Darfur.
- 13 Reuters [UN/New York] March 6, 2007.
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- 15 One World [UN/New York] February 16, 2007.
- 16 MSF, “While attention is focused on Darfur, an emergency situation is unfolding in eastern Chad,” June 8, 2007; The survey also revealed that one child in five was suffering from acute malnutrition.
- 17 Reuters [N’Djamena] May 25, 2007.
- 18 Associated Press [Geneva] March 20, 2007.
- 19 The Observer [UK] [Chad/Darfur] March 4, 2007.
- 20 Press release by the UN High Commission for Refugees [Geneva] March 27, 2007.
- 21 For more detail on Darfur, see the [full version](#) of this report.
- 22 Reuters [Khartoum] April 23, 2007.
- 23 The [full version](#) of this report includes sections on the severely compromised humanitarian access in Darfur, malnutrition in Darfur, general existence in the camps, and a discussion of the effectiveness of a UN forces in Darfur.
- 24 For more detail regarding the genocidal character of such attacks in Darfur, see the [full version](#) of this report.
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Annex VI: Chad 2006–2012



Photography credit: Mia Farrow

OURE CASSONI REFUGEE CAMP IN EASTERN CHAD (2007)

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees has established twelve camps in eastern Chad for Darfuri refugees. Especially earlier in the catastrophe, there were serious challenges at these camps in providing enough shelter, food, and water for humans and animals; a scarcity of arable land has also created tensions with the host communities. Oure Cassoni is the northernmost of the camps—on the very edge of the Sahara Desert. Shelters of any fabric quickly disintegrate in the fierce sandstorms that sweep the area. UNHCR estimates that in 2012 there are [288,000 Darfuri refugees who remain in Chad](#).



Photograph and copy credit: Jerry Fowler/Enough Project

TOULOUM REFUGEE CAMP, EASTERN CHAD (NOVEMBER 26, 2007)
“I was struck by many things about the refugees I met, not least their incredible dignity.”

Jerry Fowler, former director of the Committee on Conscience, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum



Photograph credit: Mia Farrow

CHILDREN PLAYING IN A HOOBOOB IN EASTERN CHAD



Photography credit: Mia Farrow

WOMAN IN EASTERN CHAD, DECEMBER 2007

Women are disproportionately numerous in both the IDP camps in Darfur and the refugee camps in eastern Chad; it is anomalous in Darfuri cultures for women to be the head of households, and this has created many strains on these women. They often must take on heavy work responsibilities that would normally fall to the men. And many women are traumatized by the rape, murder, and loss they witnessed in Darfur. Physicians for Human Rights produced an extremely revealing, and dispiriting, account of the lives of these refugee women ([2009](#)).



Photography credit: withheld by request

WOMEN WORKING IN EASTERN CHAD

Many women have become heads of households, an unfamiliar role and one that does not relieve them of other work responsibilities. Many of these women are exhausted and demoralized after years existing as refugees.



Photography credit: Mia Farrow

BLINDING SANDSTORMS CAN MAKE LIFE FOR DARFURI REFUGEES EVEN MORE
DIFFICULT IN EASTERN CHAD (JULY 2006)



Photography credit: withheld upon request

OURE CASSONI, EASTERN CHAD (2006)

If these refugees are still alive, they are very likely still in eastern Chad, with no prospect of returning to their homes in any foreseeable future



Photography credit: UN IRIN

DARFURI CHILDREN BORN IN EASTERN CHAD
MAY NEVER SEE THEIR “HOMELAND”



Photography credit: UN IRIN

LIFE AS SHE WILL KNOW IT FOR
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE



Photography credit: Mia Farrow

OURE CASSONI, 2007